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Abstract
Su¢ ciently persistent rise in nominal interest increases ination rate in short-
run. This short-run comovement of nominal interest rate and ination rate is known
as Neo-Fisherianism. This paper proposes a policy based on Neo-Fisherianism to
escape Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) using a textbook forward looking New Keynesian
model. I have shown that proposed policy with properly chosen ination target and
persistence can stimulate economy and escape ZLB by raising nominal interest rate.
I have also shown that the proposed policy is robust to varying degrees of price
stickiness.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom says rise in nominal interest rate is contractionary; it reduces
ination and depresses economic activity in the short-run. On the other hand, Fischer
E¤ect suggests a positive relationship between ination and nominal interest rate in the
long-run. However, recent data of low ination rate with near zero nominal interest rate
of US, Europe and Japan indicates a positive relationship of nominal interest rate and
ination even in short-run. This short-run comovement of nominal interest rate and
ination is known as Neo-Fisherianism (see, Garín, et. al, 2018, Cochrane, 2016, 2017,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2014, 2017 and 2018 for detail). This paper proposes a policy
based on Neo-Fisherianism to escape Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) or liquidity trap.1
Large adverse demand shock sends nominal interest rate to ZLB, where conventional
monetary policy looses its ability to stimulate economy by reducing it further. After
worldwide nancial crisis started from 2007-08 and economic slum of Japan during last
two decades, ZLB is no longer a mere theoretical curiosity. A large body of literature
devoted to analyze monetary policy suggest a major role to expected ination to stimulate
economy activity when nominal interest rate is near zero. While Krugman (1998) suggests
to increase expected ination through a permanent rise in money growth,2 Svensson (2003)
argues for currency depreciation to achieve a higher price level target for stimulating
economic activity at ZLB.3
Beside these, a large body of literature have also been devoted to analyze optimal
conduct of monetary policy at ZLB. Papers analyzing the optimal monetary policy at ZLB
include Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, et. al. (2005), Adam and Billi (2006,
2007), Nakov (2008), Werning (2012) and Cochrane (2017). Using a textbook forward
looking New Keynesian model, these papers suggest a "forward guidance" policy where
monetary authority retains its ability to stimulate economy by promising a path of future
interest rates which can stimulate expected ination. The optimal policy at ZLB is divided
into two parts, e.g., optimal discretionary policy and optimal policy under commitment.
1ZLB and liquidity trap are used synonymously in this paper.
2See, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) for a discussion on the advantage of interest based policy over
money based policy to combat ZLB.
3Much of the literature on monetary policy in a liquidity trap expands policy to unconventional
methods, which are e¤ective to the extent that nancial-market arbitrage is imperfect and/or the quantity
of money has an e¤ect on the economy independent of its e¤ect on the real interest rate. These policies
are interesting and potentially useful, but the simple New Keynesian model is not complex enough to
provide a role for them. Examples of unconventional monetary policy include Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2004), Blinder (2000, 2010), Bernanke (2002), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart and
Sack (2004), Clouse et.al. (2003) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2004,2005).
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Since monetary authority cannot inuence individual expectations, nominal interest rate
under discretion remains zero as long as adverse demand shock is strong enough to keep
natural rate of interest negative. However, economy exits ZLB under discretion as soon
as natural rate of interest becomes positive.
While optimal discretionary policy is credible, it involves higher welfare loss than policy
under optimal commitment. Optimal policy under commitment can inuence individual
expectations optimally and produces lower welfare loss than discretion by delaying exit
from ZLB. Such promises even if non-credible, allows optimal commitment to generate
extra stimulus to produce lower welfare loss than discretion. Moreover, the extent of
recession and deation under commitment is also lower than discretion. Note, optimal
policies both under discretion and commitment discussed above do not escape ZLB and
associated recession. In fact, they allow economy to fall into recession initially and choose
the date of exit according to the requirement of stimulus needed by optimal monetary
policy.
This paper on the other hand stands at another extreme. Unlike optimal policy
at ZLB, this paper proposes policy to escape ZLB when economy gets hit by a large
adverse demand shock. The proposed policy is based on the textbook forward looking
NewKeynesian model and its property of Neo-Fisherianism. The textbook NewKeynesian
model produces short-run comovement between nominal interest rate and ination rate
when change in ination target is su¢ ciently persistent. Garín, et. al. (2018) shows a
persistent rise in ination target increases both output and expected ination through
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and the rise in output is consequently matched by
a su¢ cient reduction in real interest rate through expectational IS equation. Note, when
expected ination rises su¢ ciently due to a persistent increase in ination target, real
interest rate may fall and nominal interest rate can rise, yielding a comovement between
nominal interest rate and ination rate in short-run, known as Neo-Fisherianism in the
literature.4 Garín, et. al. (2018) further shows that the textbook New Keynesian model
follows Neo-Fisherianism due to its forward looking nature and the same model may ceases
to follow Neo-Fisherianism under hybrid Phillips curve with both forward and backward
looking ination rate) due to the presence "rule of thumb" price setters in Phillips curve
(see, Gali and Gertler, 1999).5
The theory of Neo-Fisherianism as noted by Garín, et. al. (2018), is advanced in
4See, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) for a nice discussion on conventinal wisdom, Fisher e¤ect and
Neo-Fisherianism.
5Moreover, both Cochrane (2016) and Garín, et. al. (2018) shows that the textbook New Keynesian
model is more likely to be Neo-Fisherian when prices are less sticky.
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several theoretical writings of John Cochrane and Steven Williamson.6 Uribe (2018)
is the rst to nd empirical evidence of Neo-Fisherianism while estimating a Bayesian
SVAR model for postwar US and Japan. He shows while a rise in nominal interest rate,
expected to be transitory is both contractionary and deationary, it is inationary when
expected to be permanent. Moreover, the paper also shows that the rise in nominal
interest rate, which is expected to be permanent is expansionary too as it keeps real
interest rate remains low through out the transition. Uribe (2018) also argues that proper
identication of permanent and temporary shock can provide answer to the issue of price
puzzle (see, Eichenbaum, 1992).
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) has proposed a policy to avoid liquidity trap using
a model of endowment economy. They have used a Taylor rule for their analysis that
depends only on ination rate (not on output) with an exit strategy (from liquidity trap)
where monetary authority promptly switches to set a deterministic nominal interest rate
as soon as ination rate goes below a pre-determined threshold level. Authors show
that, such a truncated Taylor rule is able to avoid liquidity trap by raising inationary
expectation. However, the model used by them is not only based on endowment economy
but also assumes complete price exibility. The counterfactual assumption of complete
price exibility held deation costless, which is not true in reality as correctly identied
by the author themselves.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) on the other hand uses the full blown DSGE model
with downward nominal wage rigidity to show (i) standard dynamic optimization model
can produce jobless growth recovery observed in US, Japan and Europe in recent times and
(ii) an appropriate policy prescription to avoid liquidity trap entails proper identication
of the characteristics of the shock pushing economy into liquidity trap. They show if
economy falls into liquidity trap due to negative condence shock, raising nominal interest
rate to its intended target for an extended period of time boosts inationary expectations
and foster employment. The paper also argues that a proper policy to combat liquidity
trap in this context should of Neo-Fisher in nature.
Using the property of Neo-Fisherianism of the textbook forward looking New Keyne-
sian model, this paper proposes policy that can escape ZLB through a persistent rise in
ination target when economy gets hit by adverse demand shock, large enough to send
the economy to ZLB. I have shown that, the policy proposed by me where ination target
follows a rst order autoregressive process with half-life 2:40 quarters not only escapes
6See, Williamson (2016) for a nice discussion on the role of Neo-Fisherianism in the context of low in-
ation rate. Also see, posts on Cochranes blog (http://johnhcochrane. blogspot.com/) and Williamsons
blog (http://newmonetarism.blogspot.com/).
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ZLB but also robust to various degrees of price stickiness. I have also shown that my pro-
posed policy is characterized completely by the persistence and value of ination target
at initial period, chosen by the monetary authority so that economy gets enough stimulus
to escape ZLB with positive nominal interest rate.
It is worth remembering here that, the e¤ectiveness of a policy depends heavily on
its communication and credible implementation. Therefore, it is important to discuss
these properties for the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism too. Note, while analyzing the
communication of optimal forward guidance policy using standard Taylor rule with time
varying ination target, Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018) shows, (i) we can replicate dis-
cretionary policy by choosing zero ination target and (ii) we can replicate optimal policy
under commitment by choosing appropriate non-zero ination target whose persistence
is determined by the stable root of the system post-exit. As a result, the optimal policy
under discretion and commitment can be communicated successfully using ination target
and its persistence as it can be described using the time path of nominal interest rate.
Now, since policy based on Neo-Fisherianism is also characterized by ination target and
its persistence, it can similarly be communicated completely by them. Nevertheless, in
sharp contrast with the standard forward guidance policy that keeps nominal interest rate
low longer, the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism can be communicated as a policy that
increases nominal interest rate instantaneously and allows it to converge to its long-run
value gradually through an appropriate choice of a su¢ ciently persistent ination target.
Note, policy based on Neo-Fisherianism requires increasing nominal interest rate at
ZLB to stimulate economy, contradicting the conventional wisdom. Moreover, the pol-
icy based on Neo-Fisherianism is dynamically inconsistent and hence non-credible too as
it requires to keep ination target positive even if ZLB on nominal interest rate is no
longer binding. Therefore, implementation and e¤ectiveness of such policies requires re-
education of general public through e¤ective, transparent and periodic communication of
the monetary authority about their policy stance and future course of action. Literature
do have evidence that timely e¤ective communications about monetary policy helps shap-
ing individual expectations and has signicant impact on the economy. While, Bernanke
et. al. (2004) has shown that central bank statement and other types of nancial and
economic news do have signicant e¤ect on asset prices, Davis and Wynne (2016) has
shown that the extent of monetary policy shocks of US increases with volume of FOMC
report. Blinder (2008) has a nice survey of literature on the importance and strategies
of central bank communication to inuence nancial market and achieve macroeconomic
stability. Beside these, the growing literature of Epidemiology has shown news about
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ination/prices published in news paper, magazines etc. has signicant impact on house-
hold ination expectation formation. Lei, et. al. (2015) has shown news published in
leading Chinese news paper and magazine has impact on household ination expectations
of China. Using same theory of epidemiology, Saakshi, et. al. (2018) has shown that
information of ination/prices obtained from Google Trend helps Indian households to
form their expectations on ination.7 Moreover, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) argues
that the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism can be implemented credibly as general public,
having observed low ination rate with near zero nominal interest rate will gradually in-
ternalize the possibility raising ination expectations by increasing nominal interest rate
at ZLB.
However, the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism has its own cost and benet. In this
paper, I have shown that the welfare loss of the proposed policy is close but higher than
optimal discretionary policy and hence higher than policy under optimal commitment
too. On the other hand, policy based on Neo-Fisherianism can escape ZLB and associated
recession and deation completely. We know recession is "bad" and it has negative impact
on the economy both in short-run and long-run. Moreover, recession has its own dynamics
which is generally very persistent and often goes out of control once sets in. Along
with this, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) shows that, due to the presence of nancial
frictions and downward nominal wage rigidity, macroeconomic adjustment in the context
of deation becomes costly as it yields more distressed nancial market condition. Beside
this, I also feel that communicating policy based on Neo-Fisherianism which is associated
output expansion at the cost of a bit more welfare loss than optimal forward guidance
policies is far more easier to communicate than the optimal forward guidance policy
producing temporary recession but smaller overall welfare loss. This is because general
people can observe recession and feel the pain of unemployment easily but cannot observe
the implicit welfare loss incurred by the monetary authority. Given this backdrop, policy
that escapes ZLB and associated recession and deation seems more desirable to me even
if it comes with a little more welfare loss.8
7Saakshi, et. al. (2018) also has a nice review of literature on the topic of Epidemiology and ination
expectation formation of households.
8Note, in the context of the New Keynesian macroeconomic model with a Taylor Rule for the nominal
interest rate, there is another reason to escape ZLB. The Taylor Rule requires the nominal interest rate
to rise in response to an increase in ination and/or the output gap. When these responses are large
enough, the model has two unstable roots, yielding a unique determinate equilibrium. However, at ZLB
with the interest rate xed at zero, there is a single unstable root, creating indeterminacy and leaving a
role for sunspot equilibria. Certainly, calculating the policy rate given such indeterminacy is not desirable
to the monetary authority.
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2 Monetary Policy in the Simple NewKeynesian DSGE
Model
2.1 Simple New Keynesian Model
FollowingWalsh (2017) andWoodford (2003), I represent the textbook forward looking
New Keynesian model through an IS curve derived from the log-linearized Euler Equation
of the representative agent and representing the aggregate demand of the economy (equa-
tion (1)) and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived from a model of Calvo
pricing (Calvo, 1983) and log-linearized around zero long-run ination rate (equation
(2)).9NKPC represents the aggregate supply of the economy.
yt = Et (yt+1)   [it   rnt   Ett+1] (1)
t = Et (t+1) + yt: (2)
In these equations yt denotes the output gap; ination (t) is the deviation about a
long-run value of zero; it denotes the nominal interest rate,  represents the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution with   0;  represents the degree of price stickiness;10
 2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor. The natural rate of interest embodies the combina-
tion of the long-run natural rate together with demand shocks associated with preferences,
technology, scal policy, etc. Note, following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), the de-
mand shock, ut also captures the shock in condence in the simple New Keynesian model
discussed here. I assume demand shock follows an AR(1) process as given below,
ut = uut 1 + t; 0 < u < 1 (3)
and natural rate of interest is dened as,
rnt = r
n    1ut (4)
where, rn =  1   1 is the long-run natural rate of interest. Following Woodford (2003,
9This does not require that the ination rate be zero in the long run, only that it not be so far from
zero to make the linearization inappropriate (Woodford 2003, p. 79).
10 = (1 s)(1 s)s
 1+!
1+!" , where s 2 (0; 1) represents the fraction of randomly selected rms that cannot
adjust their price optimally in a given period. Therefore, s = 0 )  ! 1 ) complete exibility and
s = 1)  = 0) complete stickiness. Hence,  2 (0;1)) incomplete exibility. ! > 0 is the elasticity
of rms real marginal cost with respect to its own output, " > 0 is the price elasticity of demand of the
goods produced by monopolistic rms. See, Adam and Billi (2006) and Woodford (2003) for details.
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Chapter 4), we do not add an independent shock to ination in the Phillips Curve.11
This restricts the analysis to the case where monetary policy faces no trade-o¤ between
ination and the output gap.
2.2 Taylor Rule
The method, typically employed in NewKeynesian models for determining the nominal
interest rate is to assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1983).
In Taylors original rule, the nominal interest rate is set to equal a xed real rate plus a
xed ination target and to respond positively to deviations of ination and output from
xed target values. The Taylor Rule, log linearized about long-run equilibrium values of







+  (t   t ) + y (yt   yt ) ;  > 1; 0 < y < 1; (5)
Liquidity trap is dened as a situation of a big enough demand shock causing rnt < 0. I
assume ination target to follow a deterministic AR(1) process as given below.
t = 

t 1; 0 <  < 1 (6)
I allow the monetary authority to choose a target value for ination (t ) greater than the
long-run value of zero with persistence .12 Both ination target and its persistence is
determined by monetary authority.
When the ination target is positive, solution of equation (2) implies that the output
gap target is given by yt =
1 

t : Substituting the value of output gap target to equation
(5) and collecting terms gives,
it = r
n
t + t + yyt   zt (7)
where,






11Adam and Billi (2006) demonstrate that calibrated supply shocks are not large enough to send the
economy to the zero lower bound.
12There are empirical evidences of time varying ination target in the literature. Ireland (2007) argues
that US ination can be explained by a New Keynesian model with a Taylor Rule only if the ination
target is allowed to vary over time. Additionally, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Rudebusch and Wu (2004),
Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) provide evidence of a time-varying
short-run ination target for the US.
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Taylor rule given in equation (5) follows Taylor principle where nominal interest rate
responds strongly enough to endogenous variables that solves the problem of indetermi-
nacy. Specically, Bullard and Mitra (2002) demonstrate that if  and y are large
enough such that equations (1) and (2), with equation (5) substituted for the interest
rate, yields a dynamic system with two unstable roots, corresponding to the two forward-
looking variables, then the equilibrium is unique. Note, we get, z > 0 when Taylor
Principle is satised with,  > 1; 0 < y < 1.
Using equations (1), (2), and (7), and denoting the unstable roots of the system as 1










 (1   ) (2   )z

t : (9)
Both the output gap and ination respond positively to the ination target. This is
because an increase in the ination target raises inationary expectations, reducing the
real interest rate, stimulating current spending. Note that the Taylor Rule, with a time-
varying intercept dependent on the natural rate of interest, eliminates any e¤ect of ut;
which does not operate through t : Substituting equilibrium values for t and yt from






t where q =

+ y (1  )
 (1   ) (2   )   1

(10)
Note, q captures both direct and indirect e¤ect of ination target on nominal interest
rate. The indirect e¤ect of ination target on nominal interest rate, captured by the rst
term of the square bract in the expression of q above rises with the persistence of ination
target, . For  high enough the indirect e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect and we observe
the short-run comovement of nominal interest rate and ination rate and our model would
follow the Neo-Fisherianism.
13Taylor principle implies z > 0, implies i > 1; i = 1; 2; yielding sunspot free determinant equilibrium
given in equation (8) and (9)
14These are the rational expectations solutions, ignoring the lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
If we are able to manipulate t to avoid the lower bound, then these are the equilibrium solutions.
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2.3 The Loss Function
The model is completed with determination of the nominal interest rate. We consider
two alternative methods to specify the nominal interest rate. The rst follows Woodford














;  2 [0;1): (11)
Woodford derives equation (11) as a linear approximation to the utility function of the
representative agent when equilibrium ination is zero and the exible-price value for
output is e¢ cient.15
To explain rst optimal policy, dene a threshold value for ut as u^ = {. Note, when
demand shock is small (ut < u^) so that rnt > 0, the optimal policy is, it = r
n
t with
t = t = yt = 0; yielding L1 = 0. However, if demand shock is large (ut  u^) so that
rnt < 0, optimal policy is no longer 

t = 0. This is because 

t = 0 yields it = r
n
t < 0
which is not possible since nominal interest has ZLB.
A large body of literature have analyzed the optimal policy under ZLB and its imple-
mentation as discussed above. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018) have analyzed optimal
policy at ZLB with uncertainty in the persistence of the shock. To keep their analysis
analytically tractable, the paper assumes that individuals are uncertain about the persis-
tence of adverse demand shock initially, which can take three di¤erent values, e.g., 0.85,
0.9 and 0.95 with probability 0.25, 0.50 and 0.25 respectively. As a result, there can be
three di¤erent time paths of natural rate of interest depending on the realized persistence
of the shock, which individuals get to know after an year. Note, such a specication of
natural rate of interest yields three di¤erent time paths for optimal output gap, ination
and nominal interest rate both under discretion and commitment. I have used the al-
gorithm of Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018) to calculate welfare loss under discretion
and commitment when the realized persistence of the shock is 0.9. In the analysis of
Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018), economy never reverts back to ZLB once exits. Note,
this is true for my analysis as well. The policy based on Neo-Fisherianism proposed by
me is based on a model which assumes nonoccurrence of ZLB once economy exits out of
it. Hence, I have used welfare losses obtained by Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2008) as
benchmark to compare the same produced by the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism.
15The government can subsidize rms to increase production to the perfectly competitive level.
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3 The Policy Based on Neo-Fischerianism
The issue in a liquidity trap is how to stimulate output and ination without reducing
the nominal interest rate. The Neo-Fisherianism does the same. To understand the
intuition of Neo-Fisherianism and how it escapes ZLB, note that equations (8) and (9)
reveal that stimulating output and ination requires raising the ination target. Also
note that the coe¢ cient on t in equation (10) is increasing in the degree of persistence
of the short-run ination target, given by . In the New Keynesian model, the direct
e¤ect of an increase in the ination target is a reduction in the nominal interest rate, and
this stimulates demand and ination. However, the increase in the ination target also
raises expectations of ination, further stimulating demand, and through the Taylor Rule
responses to ination and the output gap, leads to an increase in the interest rate. For
large enough persistence of the short-run ination target, this indirect e¤ect dominates,
implying that an increase in the ination target raises the nominal interest rate, ination
and output.16 To assure that the monetary authority can escape ZLB by stimulating the
economy with an increase in the short-run ination target, the monetary authority must
set  high enough such that q in equation (10) is positive, allowing the indirect e¤ect of
the increase in the ination target to dominate. Given this let me propose two policies
that can escape ZLB and the associated recession.
3.1 Policy A: Escape ZLB with Fixed Nominal Interest Rate
Suppose, economy is hit by a large adverse demand shock in period 1 such that, ut  u^
and t = 0 is no longer a feasible policy since it < 0. I propose, once ut  u^; the short-
run ination target switches to a positive ination-target rule with the target given by






To maintain equation (12) going forward, it is necessary that the autoregressive coe¢ cient
on the ination target, given by ; equals u: We have seen episode of ZLB persists for a
long period time for Japan and US, yielding large u.
17Therefore, setting  = u satises
16This is why calibrated models fail to nd a liquidity e¤ect of a negative interest rate shock when
persistence is high.
17Ireland (2004) provides an estimate of persistence of 0.95, Adam and Billi (2006) estimate persistence
at 0.8.
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the restriction on q in equation (10).18 Additionally, the monetary authority must continue
to follow this policy until t  0: Once t = 0; the monetary authority can switch back
to the zero target ination rule until the demand shock again exceeds the threshold value.
Note. the policy with a positive ination target cannot switch back to that with a zero
ination target once the demand shock falls below the threshold value (u^) because this
would violate the promise of strong persistence in the ination target, as implied by a
high value of : The strong persistence is needed for an increase in the ination target to
imply an equilibrium increase in the interest rate instead of a decrease. An interest rate
reduction in a liquidity trap is not feasible.
We illustrate the quantitative e¤ects of our proposal using the RBC parameterization
from Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018),
 = 1;  = 0:99;  = 0:057;  = 0:0074;  = 1:5; y = 0:5; u = 0:9:
All values are expressed at quarterly rates. The values for the elasticity of substitution
and the discount factor are standard. The value of  is consistent with 44% of rms
adjusting their price each period. We set the persistence of the monetary policy response
 = u; yielding q > 0. We let the adverse demand shock be large enough to imply a
negative interest rate under optimal policy, were such a value possible, u1 = 0:02253508.19
Impulse responses to the demand shock, with a Taylor Rule given by equation (10),
18If not, the restriction on q must be satised, and the ination target must disappear more slowly
than the demand shock, implying that it will not be possible to follow equation (12) going forward. The
next policy we propose deals explicitly with this case.
19Note, time period takes integer values only in discrete time. Therefore, optimality in discrete time
is achieved only at few initial values of demand shock. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2018) shows that a
solution in discrete time might be far away from optimal solution if the exit time from ZLB is non-integer
for some initial value of demand shock. As a result, extra care needs to be taken while choosing the value
of initial demand shock for analyzing optimal policy at ZLB under discrete time. See, Chattopadhyay
and Daniel (2018) for detail.
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and a time-varying ination target, given by equation (12), are shown in Figure 1.





























































Figure 1: Impulse Response under Policy A
The demand shock itself has a negative e¤ect on output and ination. The monetary
authority needs to stimulate by reducing the real interest rate. However, when the demand
shock is su¢ ciently adverse, the Taylor Rule with a xed long-run ination target requires
the nominal interest rate to fall below zero, implying that monetary policy looses its
traditional nominal interest rate instrument.
Our policy provides an alternative way of manipulating the real interest rate. In re-
sponse to the strong adverse demand shock, the monetary authority increases inationary
expectations by raising the time-varying ination target and promising to keep it high for
a long period of time by promising strong persistence. With su¢ cient persistence, the in-
crease in inationary expectations reduces the real interest rate, stimulating demand and
ination, even if the nominal interest rate does not actually fall. This is known as Neo-
Fisherianism in the literature. In the impulse response output, ination, and the ination
target all rise initially, and subsequently fall as the shock vanishes. Since persistence in
the short-run ination target and in the demand shock are both high and since the policy
with a positive short-run ination target must persist until the demand disturbance has
vanished, ination and the output gap remain above their long-run target values of zero
12
for a long period of time.
This policy keeps the nominal interest rate at its long-run equilibrium value of rn.
However, this is not a xed interest rate policy. The nominal interest rate is allowed to
respond to deviations of ination and the output gap from their time-varying, short-run
target values by  and y. Should sunspot shocks arise, the promise to o¤set them is
credible, assuring that they do not arise in equilibrium. Since the nominal interest rate
does not fall, this policy generates very large increases in output and ination with initial
increases of 7:01% and 3:67%; respectively, at annual rates. As a result Policy A causes
a welfare loss almost 12 times higher that optimal under discretion and 128 times higher
than optimal forward guidance policy.
However, there is no reason the monetary authority must keep the nominal interest
rate this high. Under our policy proposal, the nominal interest rate must be above zero
and it must retain the ability to respond, using the Taylor Principle, to deviations in
ination and output. Following this principle, I propose the next policy which escapes
ZLB with reasonable welfare loss.
3.2 Policy B: Escape ZLB with Variable Nominal Interest Rate
Suppose, economy is hit by a large adverse demand shock in period 1that can push
the economy into liquidity trap with zero ination target policy. However, now I allow
0 < it  rn , for all t. Therefore, using equation (10), I propose a switching policy which







where,  and  are chosen by the monetary authority to minimize welfare loss subject to
it > 0, for all t. Note, this policy is not unique since feasible values for  are not unique.
When  = 0; and  = u; this policy is identical with Policy A. The impulse responses
based on equation (13) with  = 0:75 and  = 0:0075375968 are given in Figure 2. Figure
2 shows that Policy B can escape ZLB by stimulating inationary expectations. Rise in
inationary expectations, fall in nominal interest rate and high persistence of ination
target keeps real interest rate low for a long period of time and provides the required
stimulus to escape ZLB and associated recession. Comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2 we
see that Policy B yields smaller deviation in ination with initial values at annual rates
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of 1:60% but slightly higher uctuations in output with initial values at annual rates of
7:21% than Policy A. However, even if there is higher uctuations in output, Policy B
with a half-life of ination target, output and ination rate approximately 2:4 quarters
yields lower welfare loss than Policy A as ination has higher weight than output in the
loss function.20 I have seen while welfare loss under Policy B is 12 times higher than
optimal forward guidance policy it is only 1:13 times higher than optimal discretionary
policy.






























































Figure 2: Impulse Response under Policy B
3.3 Robustness of the Policy
Countries do di¤er according to their degree of price stickiness and textbook New
Keynesian model predicts severe recession at ZLB when prices are less sticky (Cochrane,
2017). However, since the textbook New Keynesian model is more likely to be Neo-
Fisherian when prices are less sticky (Cochrane, 2016 and Garín, et. al., 2018), it provide
a better scope to the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism to combat liquidity trap e¤ectively
successfully .Therefore, analyzing policy to escape ZLB and examining its robustness
under di¤erent degrees of price stickiness is important. Here, I check the robustness of
20Half life of ination target which follows an AR(1) process is calculated as, log(0:5)log()
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my proposed policy under varying degree of price stickiness. Note, the policy based on
Neo-Fisherianism proposed above is completely characterized by the combination of  and
.21 I call a policy robust when the combination of  and  survives relevant parametric
changes. Also note that a robust policy is desirable to the monetary authority for its easy
communication to the public.
To check the robustness of our proposed policy, I have allowed fraction rms who
choose their price optimally each period to increase from 44% to 99% (implying reduction
of s from 66% to 1%) keeping other parameters unchanged. This produces a steeper
aggregate supply curve with  increasing from 0:057 to 31:32. Since identical demand
shock with steeper supply curve yields higher uctuation to ination than output, it
produces higher welfare loss too as ination has higher weight in loss function than output.
Here, my objective here is to nd a combination of  and  which keep nominal interest
rate positive and produces welfare loss as little as possible. Note, at least lower  and/or
 would serve my purpose. A lower value of  would lower ination target and reduce
uctuations of ination and output and a lower  on the other hand would bring ination
target and hence output and ination quickly to zero after an initial increase. Hence,
a lower  and/or  can o¤set the impact of higher  and produce lower welfare loss. I
nd that the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism with combination of  = 0:75;(half-life of
ination target, output and ination rate approximately 2:4 quarters) and initial period
rise in ination target,  = 0:0075375968 is robust as it produces the best outcome for
any  2 [0:057; 31:32].
Figure 3 shows the impulse response with  = 31:32. Three important characteristics
of Figure 3 are worth mentioning here. First, steeper New Keynesian Phillips curve
causes higher uctuations in ination (initial uctuations rises from 1:60% to 3:99% at an
annualized rate) and lower uctuations in output (initial uctuation falls from 7:21% to
3:28% at annualized rate) and produces almost 0:01 times lower welfare loss than the case
when  = 0:057. Second, rise in  reduces z but increases q by allowing indirect e¤ect
of ination target on nominal interest rate to dominate the direct e¤ect.22 However,
though the opposite movement of z and q reduces their product, it keeps the time path
of nominal interest rate almost unchanged (see, impulse response of nominal interest rate
in Figure 2) by raising ination target and keeping the product of z and q and  almost
21 (determines the magnitude of initial ination target) tand  (persistence of ination target) deter-
mines the time path of ination target which characterizes the time path of output, ination, ination
expectation, nominal interest rate and real interest rate.
22Rise of q with  implies that the textbook New keynesian model is more likely to follow Neo-
Fisherianism when prices are more exible. Garín, et. al. (2018) obtained the same result too.
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unchanged. Third, increasing expected ination with unchanged nominal interest rate
reduces real interest rate further to higher negative values. Note, output depends on
the present value demand shock and negative of real interest rate (obtained from forward
solution of equation (1)). The su¢ ciently negative real interest rate can stimulates output
and escape recession even after o¤setting the adverse demand shock completely.































































3.4 Implementation and Credibility
Under optimal forward guidance policy, monetary authority needs to commit to a
path of nominal interest rate which remains at zero for some extra period of time even if
nominal interest rate has already been exited ZLB by then. Although this delayed exit
provides the extra stimulus to produce lower welfare loss, the optimal forward guidance
policy is dynamically inconsistent and hence not credible. Based on same logic, the policy
based Neo-Fisherianism discussed above is dynamically inconsistent too. To implement
it, the monetary authority must have the ability to commit to the interest rate rule with
a time-varying target and must be able to continue to keep the short-run ination target
above its long-run level as long as the ination target exceeds zero. This requires that
the ination target remain higher than its long-run optimal value, even after the demand
shock has fallen in value su¢ ciently that the nominal interest rate with a zero target
ination rate would be positive. This is necessary to generate the strong increase in
inationary expectations required to keep the economy out of a liquidity trap following a
16
large adverse demand shock.
Additionally, for implementation, the monetary authority must be able to communi-
cate its policy to the public and its communication must have credibility. The public
must know that the short-run ination target has changed and that this change will be
very persistent. An increase in the nominal interest rate, without this communication is
insu¢ cient to escape liquidity trap. A nominal interest rate increase together with low
persistence would reduce inationary expectations, raise the real interest rate and reduce
in ination and the output gap further. The public needs to know more about policy than
is revealed by the nominal interest rate alone to make correct expectations about future
ination.
Failure to establish credibility dooms the policy. However, I feel that it should be no
more di¢ cult to establish credibility for this policy than for policies like the promise to
"blow up the economy" (Cochrane 2011) in the event of o¤-equilibrium paths for prices
and/or output, Woodfords (2003) timeless perspective policy, or optimal policy of Eggert-
son and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006). Since our policy requires commitment
to a rule, it is arguably easier to communicate than commitment to optimal policy. Svens-
sons (2003) devaluation policy has a credibility advantage because the exchange rate is
an observable piece of data, but most countries no longer peg exchange rates. Perhaps
a larger problem than getting the public to believe that the central bank would follow a
rule would be public outrage over a policy to increase ination, following the long and
successful battle to reduce it.23 The public would require re-education, countering the
prevailing wisdom that ination is always a "bad."24
4 Conclusion
The worldwide recession started from 2007-08 and the economic slum of Japan from
late nineties have forced policy makers to examine the conduct of monetary policy at
ZLB. This paper uses the property of Neo-Fisherianism of the textbook forward looking
New Keynesian model to prescribe policy that escapes ZLB. Garín, et. al. (2018) shows
that the textbook New Keynesian model under standard parameterization yields short-
run comovement of nominal interest rate and ination rate when AR (1) ination target
is persistent enough with half-life 1:5 quarters or more. I have shown that my proposed
23Krugman (1998) made this point.
24Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2014) argues that raising interest rate policy near ZLB would be credible
as public, having observed low ination rate and near zero nominal interest rate will gradually internalize
the possibility of raising nominal interest rate by the monetary authority to combat deationary pressure.
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policy is characterized completely by the persistence of ination target and its value at
the initial period. I have also shown that an initial period rise in ination target of
amount 0:007537596 with persistence 0:75 (half-life 2:4 quarters) not only escapes ZLB,
it is robust to varying degrees of price stickiness and produces welfare loss very similar to
optimal discretionary policy at ZLB.
Along with this I also have argued that, the policy based on Neo-Fisherianism has its
own cost and benet as well. I have shown that the welfare loss under the proposed policy
is close but higher than optimal policy under discretion (hence under commitment). On
the other hand, policy based on Neo-Fisherianism can escape ZLB and also the recession
associated with it. We know recession is bad and has negative impact on the economy
both in short-run and long-run. Moreover, it has its own dynamics which often goes
out of control once sets in. Moreover, deation becomes very costly especially due to
the presence of nancial frictions and downward wages rigidity (see, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2014). Along with this, textbook New Keynesian model predicts severe recessions
when prices are less sticky (Cochrane, 2017). Given this backdrop, policy that escapes
ZLB and associated recession and deation is always desirable even if it comes with a
little more welfare loss.
Moreover, even if my proposed policy is robust and communicable using ination target
and its persistence, it is dynamically inconsistent (like the optimal commitment policy
under ZLB). The implementation of this policy requires monetary authority to commit
into a forward guidance policy that keeps ination target above its long-run level even after
the demand shock has fallen in value su¢ ciently that the nominal interest rate with a zero
target ination rate would be positive. However, I also believe that it should be no more
di¢ cult to establish credibility for this policy than for policies like the promise to "blow
up the economy" (Cochrane 2011) in the event of o¤-equilibrium paths for prices and/or
output, Woodfords (2003) timeless perspective policy, or optimal policy of Eggertson
and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006). I also feel that communicating policy
based on Neo-Fisherianism which is associated output expansion at the cost of a bit more
welfare loss than optimal forward guidance policies is far more easier to communicate
than the optimal forward guidance policy producing temporary recession but smaller
overall welfare loss. This is because general people can observe recession and feel the
pain of unemployment easily but cannot observe the implicit welfare loss incurred by
the monetary authority. Hence, policy that escapes ZLB and associated recession and
deation seems more desirable to me even if it comes with a little more welfare loss.
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